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not clearly err in rejecting Friends' claim. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part, reversed in part and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Arthur R. Kleven

Orffv. United States, 358 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
farmers were not third-party beneficiaries to a contract between a
water district and the federal government, where the water district
received water from a water management project, and the farmers thus
could not utilize a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity allowing suit
for intended third-party beneficiaries or other parties to a contract).
The Westlands Water District ("Westlands") brought suit in
California against the United States in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California challenging a reduction in its
allocation of Central Valley Project ("CVP") water as violating a 1963
contract. Landowners and water users (collectively "Farmers") and the
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") intervened in the suit.
In 1995, Westlands dismissed its complaint. The Farmers remained in
the suit and filed an amended complaint. In 1998, the district court
dismissed most of the Farmers' claims. The district court initially
decided that the Farmers acted as a contracting entity and the
government waived sovereign immunity. It then determined that it
had jurisdiction to hear the remaining claims. It threw out three of
the Farmers' claims and determined that the fourth claim raised a
triable issue of fact. In 2000, pursuant to a motion for reconsideration,
the district court altered its position on the sovereign immunity issue.
It entered ajudgment in favor of the federal government in 2000. The
Farmers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. NRDC and Westlands filed briefs as interveners in the appeal.
The CVP subsists as the nation's largest federal water management
project. Westlands receives water from the CVP pursuant a 1963
contract with the United States. A previous case in 1986 ("Barcellos I')
upheld the enforceability of the 1963 contract. In the early 1990s, the
government listed the Sacramento River winter-run chinook salmon
and delta smelt of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as threatened
species under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The National
Marine Fisheries Service found that the operation of the CVP
jeopardized these species. The Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau")
reduced Westlands contractual supply of water by fifty percent. The
Bureau acted under authority of the ESA and the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act. The Farmers brought suit claiming that the
reduction violated the 1963 contract.
The court first addressed the sovereign immunity issue. It asserted
that it strictly interprets the extent of a waiver of sovereign immunity in
favor of the government. Farmers argued that issue and claim
preclusion barred the government's sovereign immunity defense.

Issue

2

COURT REPORTS

Issue preclusion requires litigated issues be identical to a previous case.
The court held that in Barcellos I, the district court rejected the
sovereign immunity claim based on the ultra vires doctrine and the
McCarran Amendment. In this case, the Farmers did not allege the
government acted in an ultra vires manner. The court also determined
that the McCarran amendment did not apply. Claim preclusion
requires the cases arise Out of the same cause of action. The court
determined that the issue in this case differed from Barcellos I because
it involved a reduction in water based on a listing under the ESA,
which occurred after the Barcellos I decision. The court dismissed the
Farmers' assertion that claim and issue preclusion barred the
government's sovereign immunity defense.
The court then addressed whether a statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity existed. It determined that the Farmers could proceed with
their claims if a waiver of sovereign immunity under 43 U.S.C. Section
390uu applied to them. Under section 390uu, the government waives
sovereign immunity in contract suits pursuant to federal reclamation
law that confirms, decrees, adjudicates, or validates the contractual
rights of a contracting entity and the United States. The Farmers
claimed that their status as intended third-party beneficiaries of the
1963 contract made them contracting entities. The court held that an
explicit reference to a third party in a contract was not dispositive of a
party's status as an intended beneficiary. It interpreted a portion of
the contract that referred to individual water users as not creating
enforceable rights. Instead, the contract created enforceable rights
with Westlands. The court conceded that various sections of the
contract mentioning individual users showed that the contracting
parties entered into the contract with the Farmers in mind. However,
that was not sufficient to create intended third-party beneficiary status
on the Farmers. The court also rejected the Farmers' argument that
the existence of subsequent contracts referencing the 1963 contract
failed to create third-party beneficiary status.
The Farmers then asserted that they sued the government as trust
beneficiaries. The claim rested on a theory that Westlands served as a
trustee for the Farmers and that Westlands failed to pursue a claim on
their behalf. The court stated that a beneficiary of a trust generally
may not sue on behalf of a trust unless a trustee will not pursue a cause
of action that a trustee should bring against a third party on behalf of
the trust beneficiary. In this exception, the beneficiary of the trust
may bring an action joining the trustee and the third party. The
beneficiary may sue the third parties who directly acted with the
trustee in the breach of the trust. The Farmers did not seek judicial
compulsion against Westlands, nor did they allege that the
government directly participated in the breach of the trust. Thus, the
court determined that the Farmers did not sue as trust beneficiaries.
The court concluded by vacating the district court's rulings on the
merits. It declared that without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the
court had no jurisdiction to decide any issues on the merits. The court
noted that in some instances, the merits are intertwined with the
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jurisdictional issues so much so that the resolution of the jurisdictional
issue depends on the merits. However, in this case, it did not need to
decide the merits to determine that it had no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
Adriano Martinez

United States v. Appel, No. 02-57182, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3006 (9th
Cir. Feb. 2, 2004) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency did
not err in utilizing the ordinary high water mark methodology to set
jurisdictional boundaries of the Ventura River under the Clean Water
Act).
John F. Appel challenged the United States Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") use of the ordinary high water mark
("OHWM")

methodology to set jurisdictional boundaries

of the

Ventura River as it traversed Appel's property. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California approved the
OHWM method and Appel appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that to determine a river's
jurisdictional boundaries under the Clean Water Act, the EPA may use
either (1) the ordinary high water mark, or (2) the limit of any
wetlands. The EPA used the high water mark because Appel had
bulldozed most of the area near the river on his property, rendering
The court reasoned that the CWA
any wetlands indiscernible.
commands the government to eventually settle upon a single
methodology. A court's task is to determine whether the method is
supported by the evidence. Because that was what occurred in the
initial case, the court found no error.
Appel argued that the district court relied on "flood flows" and he
proffered an expert witness to prove that the ordinary flow of the river
and not the peak flow or flood stage (so as to include overflow on the
flood plain) determines the high water mark. The government also
proffered an expert witness. The witness observed the physical
features of the river through field study, aerial photographs, and soil
samples to determine the location of the ordinary high water mark.
The court held that the district court was not in error when it chose to
credit the testimony of the government witness and conclude that
"flood flows" where not used in the determination. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
ChristinaValerio

